|
Why
is Wagner Worth Saving?
Slavoj
Zizek
[Printer
Friendly PDF]
Editor's Note: You will
find printed in a previous issue of this journal (Volume 1, Issue
2) a
companion interview to this article. At the conclusion of this
interview, Slavoj Zizek generously offered the journal this additional
essay as a way of illustrating many of the issues that had been discussed.
See also in this issue Joshua
Delpech-Ramey's brief essay clarifying the connection between
his interview and this article.
1. With Romanticism,
music changes its role: it is no longer a mere accompaniment of
the message delivered in speech, it contains/renders a message of
its own, "deeper" than the one delivered in words. It was Rousseau
who first clearly articulated this expressive potential of music
as such, when he claimed that, instead of merely imitating the affective
features of verbal speech, music should be given the right to "speak
for itself" - in contrast to the deceiving verbal speech, in music,
it is, to paraphrase Lacan, the truth itself which speaks. As Schopenhauer
put it, music directly enacts/renders the noumenal Will, while speech
remains limited to the level of phenomenal representation. Music
is the substance which renders the true heart of the subject, which
is what Hegel called the "Night of the World," the abyss of radical
negativity: music becomes the bearer of the true message beyond
words with the shift from the Enlightenment subject of rational
logos to the Romantic subject of the "night of the world,"
i.e., with the shift of the metaphor for the kernel of the subject
from Day to Night. Here we encounter the Uncanny: no longer the
external transcendence, but, following Kant's transcendental turn,
the excess of the Night in the very heart of the subject (the dimension
of the Undead), what Tomlison called the "internal otherworldliness
that marks the Kantian subject."1 What music renders
is no longer the "semantics of the soul," but the underlying "noumenal"
flux of jouissance beyond the linguistic meaningfulness.
This noumenal is radically different from the pre-Kantian transcendent
divine Truth: it is the inaccessible excess which forms the very
core of the subject.
2. In history
of opera, this sublime excess of life is discernible in two main
versions, Italian and German, Rossini and Wagner - so, maybe, although
they are the great opposites, Wagner's surprising private sympathy
for Rossini, as well as their friendly meeting in Paris, do bear
witness to a deeper affinity. Rossini's great male portraits, the
three from Barbiere (Figaro's "Largo il factotum,"
Basilio's "Calumnia," and Bartolo's "Un dottor della mia
sorte"), plus the father's wishful self-portrait of corruption
in Cenerentola, enact a mocked self-complaint, where one
imagines oneself in a desired position, being bombarded by demands
for a favor or service. The subject twice shifts his position: first,
he assumes the roles of those who address him, enacting the overwhelming
multitude of demands which bombard him; then, he feigns a reaction
to it, the state of deep satisfaction in being overwhelmed by demands
one cannot fulfill. Let us take the father in Cenerentola:
he imagines how, when one of his daughters will be married to the
Prince, people will turn to him, offering him bribes for a service
at the court, and he will react to it first with cunning deliberation,
then with fake despair at being bombarded with too many requests…
The culminating moment of the archetypal Rossini aria is this unique
moment of happiness, of the full assertion of the excess of Life
which occurs when the subject is overwhelmed by demands, no longer
being able to deal with them. At the highpoint of his "factotum"
aria, Figaro exclaims: "What a crowd /of the people bombarding me
with their demands/ - have mercy, one after the other /uno per
volta, per carita!", referring therewith to the Kantian experience
of the Sublime, in which the subject is bombarded with an excess
of the data that he is unable to comprehend. The basic economy is
here obsessional: the object of the hero's desire is the other's
demand.
3. This is the
excessive counterpoint to the Wagnerian Sublime, to the "hoechste
Lust" of the immersion into the Void that concludes Tristan.
This opposition of the Rossinian and of the Wagnerian Sublime perfectly
fits the Kantian opposition between the mathematical and the dynamic
Sublime: as we have just seen, the Rossinian Sublime is mathematical,
it enacts the inability of the subject to comprehend the pure quantity
of the demands that overflow him, while the Wagnerian Sublime is
dynamic, it enacts the concentrated overpowering force of the ONE
demand, the unconditional demand of love. One can also say that
the Wagnerian Sublime is the absolute Emotion - this is how one
should read the famous first sentence of Wagner's "Religion and
Art," where he claims that, when religion becomes artificial, art
can save the true spirit of religion, its hidden truth - how? Precisely
by abandoning the dogma and rendering only the authentic religious
emotion, i.e., by transforming religion into the ultimate aesthetic
experience.
4. Tristan
should thus be read as the resolution of the tension between sublime
passion and religion still operative in Tannheuser. The entreaty
at the beginning of Tannheuser enacts a strange reversal
of the standard entreaty: not to escape the constraints of mortality
and rejoin the beloved, but the entreaty addressed at the beloved
to let the hero go and return to the mortal life of pain, struggle,
and freedom. Tannheuser complains that, as a mortal, he cannot sustain
the continuous enjoyment ("Wenn stets ein Gott geniessen kann,
bin ich dem Wechsel untertan; nicht Lust allein liegt mir am Herzen,
aus Freuden sehn ich mich nach Schmerzen"). A little bit later,
Tannhauser makes it clear that what he is longing for is the peace
of death itself: "Mein Sehnen draengt zum Kampfe, nicht such
ich Wonn und Lust! Ach moegest du es fassen, Goettin! (wild) Hin
zum Tod, den ich suche, zum Tode draengt es mich!" If there
is a conflict between eternity and temporal existence, between transcendence
and terrestrial reality here, then Venus is on the side of a terrifying
ETERNITY of unbearable excessive Geniessen.
5. This provides
the key to the opera's central conflict: it is NOT, as it is usually
claimed, the conflict between the spiritual and the bodily, the
sublime and the ordinary pleasures of flesh, but a conflict inherent
to the Sublime itself, splitting it up. Venus and Elisabeth are
BOTH meta-physical figures of the sublime: neither of the two is
a woman destined to become a common wife. While Elisabeth is, obviously,
the sacred virgin, the purely spiritual entity, the untouchable
idealized Lady of the courtly love, Venus also stands for a meta-physical
excess, that of the excessively intensified sexual enjoyment; if
anything, it is Elisabeth who is closer to the ordinary terrestrial
life. In Kierkegaard's terms, one can say that Venus stands for
the Aesthetic and Elisabeth for the Religious - on condition that
one conceives here of the Aesthetic as included in the Religious,
elevated to the level of the unconditional Absolute. And therein
resides the unpardonable sin of Tannheuser: not in the fact that
he engaged in a little bit of free sexuality (in this case, the
severe punishment would have been ridiculously exaggerated), but
that he elevated sexuality, sexual lust, to the level of the Absolute,
asserting it as the inherent obverse of the Sacred. This is the
reason why the roles of Venus and Elisabeth definitely should be
played by the same singer: the two ARE one and the same person,
the only difference resides in the male hero's attitude towards
her. Is this not clear from the final choice Tannheuser has to make
between the two? When he is in his mortal agony, Venus is calling
him to join her again ("Komm, o komm! Zu mir! Zu mir!");
when he gets close to her, Wolfram cries from the background "Elisabeth!",
to which Tannheuser replies: "Elisabeth!" In the standard staging,
the mention of the dead sacred Elisabeth gives Tannheuser the strength
to avoid Venus' embrace, and Venus then leaves in fury; however,
would it not be much more logical to stage it so that Tannheuser
continues to approach THE SAME woman, discovering, when he is close
to her, that Venus really is Elisabeth? The subversive power of
this shift is that it turns around the old courtly love poetry motif
of the dazzlingly beautiful lady who, when one approaches her too
much, is revealed as a disgusting entity of rotten flesh full of
crawling worms - here, the sacred virgin is discovered in the very
heart of the dissolute seductress. So the message is not the usual
desublimation ("Beware of the beautiful woman! It is a deceptive
lure which hides the disgusting rotten flesh!"), but the unexpected
sublimation, elevation of the erotic woman to the mode of appearance
of the sacred Thing. The tension of Tannheuser is thus the
one between the two aspects of the Absolute, Ideal-Symbolic and
Real, Law and Superego. The true topic of Tannheuser is that
of a disturbance in the order of sublimation: sublimation
starts to oscillate between these two poles.
6. We can see,
now, in what precise sense Tristan embodies the "aesthetic"
attitude (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term): refusing to
compromise one's desire, one goes to the end and willingly embraces
death. Meistersinger counters it with the ethical solution:
the true redemption resides not in following the immortal passion
to its self-destructive conclusion; one should rather learn to overcome
it via creative sublimation and to return, in a mood of wise resignation,
to the "daily" life of symbolic obligations. In Parsifal,
finally, the passion can no longer be overcome via its reintegration
to society in which it survives in a gentrified form: one has to
deny it thoroughly in the ecstatic assertion of the religious jouissance.
The triad Tristan-Meistersinger-Parsifal thus follows a precise
logic: Meistersinger and Tristan render the two opposite
versions of the Oedipal matrix, within which Meistersinger
inverts Tristan (the son steals the woman from the paternal
figure; the passion breaks out between the paternal figure and the
young woman destined to become the partner of the young man), while
Parsifal gives the coordinates themselves an anti-Oedipal
twist - the lamenting wounded subject is here the paternal figure
(Amfortas), not the young transgressor (Tristan). (The closest one
comes to lament in Meistersinger is Sachs's "Wahn, wahn!"
song from Act III.) Wagner planned to have in the first half of
Act III of Tristan Parsifal to visit the wounded Tristan,
but he wisely renounced it: not only would the scene ruin the perfect
overall structure of Act III, it would also stage the IMPOSSIBLE
encounter of a character with (the different, alternate reality,
version of) ITSELF, as in the time travel science fiction narratives
where I encounter MYSELF. One can even bring things to the ridiculous
here by imagining the THIRD hero joining the two - Hans Sachs (in
his earlier embodiment, as King Mark who arrives with a ship prior
to Isolde), so that the three of them (Tristan, Mark, Parsifal),
standing for the three attitudes, debate their differences in a
Habermasian undistorted communicational exchange.
7. And one is
tempted to claim that the triad of Tristan-Meistersinger-Parsifal
is reproduced in three exemplary post-Wagnerian operas: Richard
Strauss' Salome, Puccini's Turandot and Schoenberg's
Moses und Aaron. Is not Salome yet another version
of the possible outcome of Tristan? What if, at the end of
Act II, when King Mark surprises the lovers, he were to explode
in fury and order Tristan's head to be cut off; the desperate Isolde
would then take her lover's head in her hands and start to kiss
his lips in a Salomean Liebestod. (And, to add yet another
variation of the virtual link between Salome and Tristan:
what if, at the end of Tristan, Isolde would not simply die
after finishing her "Mild und leise" - what if she were to
remain entranced by her immersion in the ecstatic jouissance,
and, disgusted by it, King Mark would give the order: "This woman
is to be killed!"?) It was often noted that the closing scene of
Salome is modelled on Isolde's Liebestod; however, what makes it
a perverted version of the Wagnerian Liebestod is that what Salome
demands, in an unconditional act of CAPRICE, is to kiss the lips
of John the Baptist ("I want to kiss your lips!") - not the contact
with a person, but with the partial object. If Salome is
a counterpart to Tristan, then Turandot is the counterpart
to Meistersinger - let us not forget that they are both operas
about the public contest with the woman as the prize won by the
hero.
8. Salome twice
insists to the end in her demand: first, she insists that the soldiers
bring to her Jokanaan; then, after the dance of seven veils, she
insists that the king Herod bring her on a silver platter the head
of Jokanaan - when the king, believing that Jokanaan effectively
is a sacred man and that it is therefore better not to touch him,
offers Salome in exchange for her dance anything she wants, up to
half of his kingdom and the most sacred objects in his custody,
just not the head (and thus the death) of Jokanaan, she ignores
this explosive outburst of higher and higher bidding and simply
repeats her inexorable demand "Bring me the head of Jokanaan." Is
there not something properly Antigonean in this request of her?
Like Antigone, she insists without regard to consequences. Is therefore
Salome not in a way, no less than Antigone, the embodiment of a
certain ethical stance? No wonder she is so attracted to Jokanaan
- it is the matter of one saint recognizing another. And how can
one overlook that, at the end of Oscar Wilde's play on which Strauss'
opera is based, after kissing his head, she utters a properly Christian
comment on how this proves that love is stronger than death, that
love can overcome death?
9. Which, then,
would be the counterpart to Parsifal? Parsifal was
from the very beginning perceived as a thoroughly ambiguous work:
the attempt to reassert art at its highest, the proto-religious
spectacle bringing together Community (art as the mediator between
religion and politics), against the utilitarian corruption of modern
life with its commercialized kitsch culture - yet at the same time
drifting towards a commercialized aesthetic kitsch of an ersatz
religion, a fake, if there ever was one. In other words, the problem
of Parsifal is not the unmediated dualism of its universe
(Klingsor's kingdom of fake pleasures versus the sacred domain of
the Grail), but, rather, the lack of distance, the ultimate identity,
of its opposites: is not the Grail ritual (which provides the most
satisfying aesthetic spectacle of the work, its two "biggest hits")
the ultimate "Klingsorian" fake? (The taint of bad faith in our
enjoyment of Parsifal as similar to the bad faith in our
enjoyment of Puccini.) For this reason, Parsifal was the
traumatic starting point which allows us to conceive of the multitude
of later operas as reactions to it, as attempts to resolve its deadlock.
The key among these attempts is, of course, Schoenberg's Moses
und Aaron, the ultimate pretender to the title "the last opera,"
the meta-opera about the conditions of (im)possibility of the opera:
the sudden rupture at the end of Act II, after Moses' desperate
"O Wort, das mir fehlt!", the failure to compose the work
to the end. Moses und Aaron is effectively anti-Parsifal:
while Parsifal retains a full naïve trust in the (redemptive)
power of music and finds no problems in rendering the noumenal divine
dimension in the aesthetic spectacle of the ritual, Moses und
Aaron attempts the impossible: to be an opera directed against
the very principle of opera, that of the stage-musical spectacle
- it is an operatic representation of the Jewish prohibition of
aesthetic representation.
10. Is the buoyant
music of the Golden Calf not the ultimate version of the bacchanalian
music in Wagner, from Tannheuser to the Flower Maidens' music
in Parsifal. And is there not another key parallel between
Parsifal and Moses und Aaron? As it was noted by Adorno,
the ultimate tension of Moses is not simply between divine
transcendence and its representation in music, but, inherent to
music itself, between the "choral" spirit of the religious community
and the two individuals (Moses and Aaron) who stick out as subjects;
in the same way, in Parsifal, Amfortas and Parsifal himself
stick out as forceful individuals - are the two "complaints" by
Amfortas not the strongest passages of Parsifal, implicitly
undermining the message of the renunciation to subjectivity? The
musical opposition between the clear choral style of the Grail community
and the chromaticism of the Klingsor universe in Parsifal
is radicalized in Moses und Aaron in the guise of the opposition
between Moses' Sprechstimme and Aaron's full song - in both
cases, the tension is unresolved.
11. What, then,
can follow this breakdown? It is here that one is tempted to return
to our starting point, to Rossinian comedy. After the complete breakdown
of expressive subjectivity, comedy reemerges - but a weird, uncanny
one. What comes after Moses und Aaron is the imbecilic "comic"
Sprechgesang of Pierrot Lunaire, the smile of a madman
who is so devastated by pain that he cannot even perceive his tragedy
- like the smile of a cat in cartoons with birds flying around the
head after the cat gets hit on the head with a hammer. The comedy
enters when the situation is too horrifying to be rendered as tragedy
- which is why the only proper way to do a film about concentration
camps is a comedy: there is something fake in doing a concentration
camp tragedy.
12. Is, however,
this the only way out? What if Parsifal also points in another
direction, that of the emergence of a new collective? If Tristan
enacts redemption as the ecstatic suicidal escape FROM the social
order and Meistersinger the resigned integration INTO the
existing social order, then Parsifal concludes with the invention
of a new form of the Social. With Parsifal's "Disclose the Grail!"
("Enthuellt den Graal!"), we pass from the Grail community
as a closed order where Grail is only revealed in the prescribed
time a ritual to the circle of the initiated, to a new order in
which the Grail has to remain revealed all the time: "No more shall
the shrine be sealed!" ("Nicht soll der mehr verschlossen sein!").
As to the revolutionary consequences of this change, recall the
fate of the Master figure in the triad Tristan-Meistersinger-Parsifal
(King Marke, Hans Sachs, Amfortas): in the first two works, the
Master survives as a saddened melancholic figure; in the third he
is DEPOSED and dies.
13. Why, then,
should we not read Parsifal from today's perspective: the
kingdom of Klingsor in the Act II is a domain of digital phantasmagoria,
of virtual amusement - Harry Kupfer was right to stage Klingsor's
magic garden as a video parlor, with Flower Girls reduced to fragments
of female bodies (faces, legs…) appearing on dispersed TV-screens.
Is Klingsor not a kind of Master of the Matrix, manipulating virtual
reality, a combination of Murdoch and Bill Gates? And when we pass
from Act II to Act III, do we not effectively pass from the fake
virtual reality to the "desert of the real," the "waste land" in
the aftermath of ecological catastrophy which derailed the "normal"
functioning of nature? Is Parsifal not a model for Keanu Reeves
in The Matrix, with Laurence Fishburne in the role of Gurnemanz?
14. One is thus
tempted to offer a direct "vulgar" answer to the question: what
the hell was Parsifal doing on his journey in the long time which
passes between Acts II and III? That the true "Grail" are the people,
its suffering. What if he simply got acquainted with human misery,
suffering and exploitation? So what if the NEW collective is something
like a revolutionary party, what if one takes the risk of reading
Parsifal as the precursor of Brecht's Lehrstuecke,
what if its topic of sacrifice points towards that of Brecht's Die
Massnahme, which was put to music by Hans Eisler, the third
great pupil of Schoenberg, after Bert and Webern? Is the topic of
both Parsifal and Die Massnahme not that of learning:
the hero has to learn how to help people in their suffering. The
outcome, however, is opposite: in Wagner compassion, in Brecht/Eisler
the strength not to give way to one's compassion and directly act
on it. However, this opposition itself is relative: the shared motif
is that of COLD, DISTANCED COMPASSION. The lesson of Brecht is the
art of COLD compassion, compassion with suffering which learns to
resist the immediate urge to help others; the lesson of Wagner is
cold COMPASSION, the distanced saintly attitude (recall the cold
girl into which Parsifal turns in Syberberg's version) which nonetheless
retains compassion. Wagner's lesson (and Wotan's insight) about
how the greatest act of freedom is to accept and freely enact what
necessarily has to occur, is strangely echoed in the basic lesson
of Brecht's "learning plays": what the young boy to be killed by
his colleagues has to learn is the art of Einverstaendnis,
of accepting his own killing which will occur anyway.
15. And what
about the misogynism which obviously sustains this option? Is it
not that Parsifal negated the shared presupposition of the
first two works, their assertion of love (ecstatic courtly love,
marital love), opting for the exclusively male community? However,
what if, here also, Syberberg was right: after Kundry's kiss, in
the very rejection of (hysterical-seductive) femininity, Parsifal
turns into a woman, adopts a feminine subjective position? What
if what we effectively get is a dedicated "radical" community led
by a cold ruthless woman, a new Joan of Arc?
16. And what
about the notion that the Grail community is an elitist closed initiatic
circle? Parsifal's final injunction to disclose the Grail undermines
this false alternative of elitism/populism: every true elitism is
universal, addressed at everyone and all, and there is something
inherently vulgar about initiatic secret gnostic wisdoms. There
is a standard complaint of the numerous Parsifal lovers:
a great opera with numerous passages of breathtaking beauty - but,
nonetheless, the two long narratives of Gurnemanz (taking most of
the first half of Acts I and III) are Wagner at his worst: a boring
recapitulation of the past deeds already known to us, lacking any
dramatic tension. Our proposed "Communist" reading of Parsifal
entails a full rehabilitation of these two narratives as crucial
moments of the opera - the fact that they may appear "boring" is
to be understood along the lines of a short poem of Brecht from
the early 1950s, addressed to a nameless worker in the GDR who,
after long hours of work, is obliged to listen to a boring political
speech by a local party functionary: "You are exhausted from long
work / The speaker is repeating himself / His speech is long-winded,
he speaks with strain / Do not forget, the tired one: / He speaks
the truth."2 This is the role of Gurnemanz - no more
and no less than the agent - the mouth-piece, why not - of truth.
In this precise case, the very predicate of "boring" is an indicator
(a vector even) of truth as opposed to the dazzling perplexity of
jokes and superficial amusements. (There is, of course, another
sense in which, as Brecht knew very well, dialectics itself is inherently
comical.)
17. And what
about the final call of the Chorus "Redeem the Redeemer!", which
some read as the anti-Semitic statement "redeem/save Christ from
the clutches of the Jewish tradition, de-Semitize him"? However,
what if we read this line more literally, as echoing the other "tautological"
statement from the finale, "the wound can be healed only by the
spear which smote it (die Wunde schliesst der Speer nur, der
sie schlug)"? Is this not the key paradox of every revolutionary
process, in the course of which not only violence is needed to overcome
the existing violence, but the revolution, in order to stabilize
itself into a New Order, has to eat its own children?
18. Wagner a
proto-Fascist? Why not leave behind this search for the "proto-Fascist"
elements in Wagner and, rather, in a violent gesture of appropriation,
reinscribe Parsifal in the tradition of radical revolutionary
parties? Perhaps, such a reading enables us also to cast a new light
on the link between Parsifal and The Ring. The
Ring depicts a pagan world, which, following its inherent logic,
MUST end in a global catastrophy; however, there are survivors of
this catastrophy, the nameless crowd of humanity which silently
witnesses God's self-destruction. In the unique figure of Hagen,
The Ring also provides the first portrait of what will later
emerge as the Fascist leader; however, since the world of The
Ring is pagan, caught in the Oedipal family conflict of passions,
it cannot even address the true problem of how this humanity, the
force of the New, is to organize itself, of how it should learn
the truth about its place; THIS is the task of Parsifal,
which therefore logically follows The Ring. The conflict
between Oedipal dynamics and the post-Oedipal universe is inscribed
within Parsifal itself: Klingsor's and Amfortas' adventures
are Oedipal, then what happens with Parsifal's big turn (rejection
of Kundry) is precisely that he leaves behind the Oedipal incestuous
eroticism, opening himself up to a new community.
19. The dark
figure of Hagen is profoundly ambiguous: although initially depicted
as a dark plotter, both in the Nibelungenlied and in Fritz
Lang's film, he emerges as the ultimate hero of the entire work
and is redeemed at the end as the supreme case of the Nibelungentreue,
fidelity to death to one's cause (or, rather, to the Master who
stands for this cause), asserted in the final slaughter at the Attila's
court. The conflict is here between fidelity to the Master and our
everyday moral obligations: Hagen stands for a kind of teleological
suspension of morality on behalf of fidelity, he is the ultimate
"Gefolgsmann."
20. Significantly,
it is ONLY Wagner who depicts Hagen as a figure of Evil - is this
not an indication of how Wagner nonetheless belongs to the modern
space of freedom? And is Lang's return to the positive Hagen not
an indication of how the XXth century marked the reemergence of
a new barbarism? It was Wagner's genius to intuit ahead of his time
the rising figure of the Fascist ruthless executive who is at the
same time a rabble-rousing demagogue (recall Hagen's terrifying
Maennerruf) - a worthy supplement to his other great intuition,
that of a hysterical woman (Kundry) well before this figure overwhelmed
European consciousness (in Charcot's clinic, in the art from Ibsen
to Schoenberg).
21. What makes
Hagen a "proto-Fascist" is his role as the unconditional support
for the weak ruler (King Gunther): he does for Gunther the "dirty
jobs" which, although necessary, have to remain concealed from the
public gaze - "Unsere Ehre heisst Treue." We find this stance,
a kind of mirror-reversal of the Beautiful Soul which refuses to
dirty its hands, at its purest in the Rightist admiration for the
heroes who are ready to do the necessary dirty job: it is easy to
do a noble thing for one's country, up to sacrificing one's life
for it - it is much more difficult to commit a CRIME for one's country
when it is needed. Hitler knew very well how to play this double
game apropos the holocaust, using Himmler as his Hagen. In the speech
to the SS leaders in Posen on October 4 1943, Himmler spoke quite
openly about the mass killing of the Jews as "a glorious page in
our history, and one that has never been written and never can be
written," explicitly including the killing of women and children:
"I did not regard myself as justified in exterminating the men -
that is to say, to kill them or have them killed - and to allow
the avengers in the shape of children to grow up for our sons and
grandchildren. The difficult decision had to be taken to have this
people disappear from the earth."
22. This is Hagen's
Treue brought to its extreme - however, was the paradoxical
price for Wagner's negative portrayal of Hagen not his Judifizierung?
A lot of historical work has been done recently trying to bring
out the contextual "true meaning" of the Wagnerian figures and topics:
the pale Hagen is really a masturbating Jew; Amfortas' wound is
really syphillis. The idea is that Wagner is mobilizing historical
codes known to everyone in his epoch: when a person stumbles, sings
in cracking high tones, makes nervous gestures, etc., "everyone
knew" this is a Jew, so Mime from Siegfried is a caricature
of a Jew; the fear of syphillis as the illness in the groin one
gets from having intercourse with an "impure" woman was an obsession
in the second half of the 19th century, so it was "clear to everyone"
that Amfortas really contracted syphillis from Kundry. Marc Weiner
developed the most perspicuous version of this decoding by focusing
on the micro-texture of Wagner's musical dramas - manner of singing,
gestures, smells - it is at this level of what Deleuze would have
called pre-subjective affects that anti-Semitism is operative in
Wagner's operas, even if Jews are not explicitly mentioned: in the
way Beckmesser sings, in the way Mime complains.
23. However,
the first problem here is that, even if accurate, such insights
do not contribute much to a pertinent understanding of the work
in question. One often hears that, in order to understand a work
of art, one needs to know its historical context. Against this historicist
commonplace, one should affirm that too much of a historical context
can blur the proper contact with a work of art - in order to properly
grasp, say, Parsifal, one should ABSTRACT from such historical
trivia, one should DECONTEXTUALIZE the work, tear it out from the
context in which it was originally embedded. Even more, it is, rather,
the work of art itself which provides a context enabling us to properly
understand a given historical situation. If, today, someone were
to visit Serbia, the direct contact with raw data there would leave
him confused. If, however, he were to read a couple of literary
works and see a couple of representative movies, they would definitely
provide the context that would enable him to locate the raw data
of his experience. There is thus an unexpected truth in the old
cynical wisdom from the Stalinist Soviet Union: "he lies as an eye-witness!"
24. There is
another, more fundamental, problem with such historicist decoding:
it is not enough to "decode" Alberich, Mime, Hagen etc. as Jews,
making the point that the Ring is one big anti-Semitic tract,
a story about how Jews, by renouncing love and opting for power,
brought corruption to the universe; the more basic fact is that
the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew itself is not a direct ultimate
referent, but already encoded, a cypher of ideological and social
antagonisms. (And the same goes for syphillis: in the second
half of the 19th century, it was, together with tuberculosis, the
other big case of "illness as a metaphor" (Susan Sontag), serving
as an encoded message about socio-sexual antagonisms, and this is
the reason why people were so obsessed by it - not because of its
direct real threat, but because of the ideological surplus-investment
in it.) An appropriate reading of Wagner should take this fact into
account and not merely "decode" Alberich as a Jew, but also ask
the question: how does Wagner's encoding refer to the "original"
social antagonism of which the (anti-Semitic figure of the) "Jew"
itself is already a cypher?
25. A further
counter-argument is that Siegfried, Mime's opponent, is in no way
simply the beautiful Aryan blond hero - his portrait is much more
ambiguous. The short last scene of Act 1 of The Twilight
(Siegfried's violent abduction of Brunhilde; under the cover of
Tarnhelm, Siegfried poses as Gunther) is a shocking interlude
of extreme brutality and ghost-like nightmarish quality. What makes
it additionally interesting is one of the big inconsistencies of
The Ring: why does Siegfried, after brutally subduing Brunhilde,
put his sword between the two when they lay down, to prove that
they will not have sex, since he is just doing a service to his
friend, the weak king Gunther? TO WHOM does he have to prove this?
Is Brunhilde not supposed to think that he IS Gunther? Before she
is subdued, Brunhilde displays to the masked Siegfried her hand
with the ring on it, trusting that the ring will serve as protection;
when Siegfried brutally tears the ring off her hand, this gesture
has to be read as the repetition of the first extremely violent
robbery of the ring in the Scene 4 of Rhinegold, when Wotan
tears the ring off Alberich's hand. The horror of this scene is
that it shows Siegfried's brutality naked, in its raw state: it
somehow "depsychologizes" Siegfried, making him visible as in inhuman
monster, i.e., the way he "really is," deprived of his deceiving
mask - THIS is the effect of the potion on him.
26. There is
effectively in Wagner's Siegfried an unconstrained "innocent" aggressivity,
an urge to directly pass to the act and just squash what gets on
your nerves - as in Siegfrid's words to Mime in the Act I of Siegfried:
"when I watch you standing, / shuffling and shambling, / servilely
stooping, squinting and blinking, / I long to seize you by your
nodding neck / and make an end of your obscene blinking!" (the sound
of the original German is here even more impressive: "seh'ich
dich stehn, gangeln und gehn, / knicken und nicken, / mit den Augen
zwicken, / beim Genick moecht'ich den Nicker packen, / den Garaus
geben dem garst'gen Zwicker!"). The same outburst is repeated
twice in Act II: "Das eklige Nicken / und Augenzwicken, / wann
endlich soll ich's / nicht mehr sehn, / wann werd ich den Albernen
los?" "That shuffling and slinking, / those eyelids blinking
- / how long must I / endure the sight? / When shall I be rid of
this fool?", and, just a little bit later: "Grade so garstig,
/ griesig und grau, / klein und krumm, / hoeckrig und hinkend, /
mit haengenden Ohren, / triefigen Augen - / Fort mit dem Alb! /
Ich mag ihn nicht mehr sehn." "Shuffling and slinking, / grizzled
and gray, / small and crooked, / limping and hunchbacked, / with
ears that are drooping, eyes that are bleary… / Off with the imp!
I hope he's gone for good!" Is this not the most elementary disgust,
repulsion felt by the ego when confronted with the intruding foreign
body? One can easily imagine a neo-Nazi skinhead uttering just the
same words in the face of a worn-out Turkish Gastarbeiter.3
27. And, finally,
one should not forget that, in the Ring, the source of all
evil is not Alberich's fatal choice in the first scene of Rhinegold:
long before this event took place, Wotan broke the natural balance,
succumbing to the lure of power, giving preference to power over
love - he tore out and destroyed the World-Tree, making out of it
his spear on which he inscribed the runes fixating the laws of his
rule, plus he plucked out one of his eyes in order to gain insight
into inner truth. Evil thus does not come from the Outside - the
insight of Wotan's tragic "monologue with Brunhilde" in the Act
II of Walkure is that the power of Alberich and the prospect
of the "end of the world" is ultimately Wotan's own guilt, the result
of his ethical fiasco - in Hegelese, external opposition is the
effect of inner contradiction. No wonder, then, that Wotan is called
the "White Alb" in contrast to the "Black Alb," Alberich - if anything,
Wotan's choice was ethically worse than Alberich's: Alberich longed
for love and only turned towards power after being brutally mocked
and turned down by the Rhinemaidens, while Wotan turned to power
after fully enjoying the fruits of love and getting tired of them.
One should also bear in mind that, after his moral fiasco in Walkure,
Wotan turns into "Wanderer" - a figure of the Wandering Jew like
already the first great Wagnerian hero, the Flying Dutchman, this
"Ahasver des Ozeans."
28. And the same
goes for Parsifal which is not about an elitist circle of
the pure-blooded threatened by external contamination (copulation
by the Jewess Kundry). There are two complications to this image:
first, Klingsor, the evil magician and Kundry's Master, is himself
an ex-Grail knight, he comes from within; second point, if one reads
the text really close, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the
true source of evil, the primordial imbalance which derailed the
Grail community, resides at its very center - it is Titurel's excessive
fixation of enjoying the Grail which is at the origins of the misfortune.
The true figure of Evil is Titurel, this obscene pere-jouisseur
(perhaps comparable to giant worm-like members of the Space Guild
from Frank Herbert's Dune, whose bodies are disgustingly
distorted because of their excessive consumption of the "spice").
29. This, then,
undermines the anti-Semitic perspective according to which the disturbance
always ultimately comes from outside, in the guise of a foreign
body which throws out of joint the balance of the social organism:
for Wagner, the external intruder (Alberich) is just a secondary
repetition, externalization, of an absolutely immanent inconsistency/antagonism
(of Wotan). With reference to Brecht's famous "What is the robbery
of a bank compared to the founding of a new bank? ", one is tempted
to say: "What is a poor Jew's stealing of the gold compared to the
violence of the Aryan's (Wotan's) grounding of the rule of Law?"
30. One of the
signs of this inherent status of the disturbance is the failure
of the big finales of Wagner's operas: the formal failure here signals
the persistence of the social antagonism. Let us take the biggest
of them all, the mother of all finales, that of The Twilight
of Gods. It is a well-known fact that, in the last minutes of
The Twilight, the orchestra performs an excessively intricate
cobweb of motifs, basically nothing less than the recapitulation
of the motivic wealth of the entire Ring - is this fact not
the ultimate proof that Wagner himself was not sure about what the
final apotheosis of the Ring "means"? Not being sure of it,
he took a kind of "flight forward" and threw together ALL the motifs.
So the culminating motif of "Redemption through Love" (a beautiful
and passionate melodic line which previously appears only in Act
III of Walkuere) cannot but make us think of Joseph Kerman's
acerbic comment about the last notes of Puccini's Tosca in
which the orchestra bombastically recapitulates the "beautiful"
pathetic melodic line of the Cavaradossi's "E lucevan le stelle,"
as if, unsure of what to do, Puccini simply desperately repeated
the most "effective" melody from the previous score, ignoring all
narrative or emotional logic.4 And what if Wagner did
exactly the same thing at the end of The Twilight?
Not sure about the final twist that should stabilize and guarantee
the meaning of it all, he took recourse to a beautiful melody whose
effect is something like "whatever all this may mean, let us make
it sure that the concluding impression will be that of something
triumphant and upbeating in its redemptive beauty." In short, what
if this final motif enacts an empty gesture?
31. It is a commonplace
of Wagner studies that the triumphant finale of Das Rheingold
is a fake, an empty triumph indicating the fragility of the gods'
power and their forthcoming downfall - however, does the same not
go also for the finale of Siegfried? The sublime duet of
Brunhilde and Siegfried which concludes the opera fails a couple
of minutes before the ending, with the entry of the motif anouncing
the couple's triumphant reunion (usually designated as the motif
of "happy love" or "love's bond") - this motif is obviously a fake
(not to mention the miserable failure of the concluding noisy-bombastic
orchestral tutti, which lacks the efficiency of the gods'
entry to Walhalla in Rhinegold). Does this failure encode
Wagner's (unconscious?) critique of Siegfried? Recall the additional
curious fact that this motif is almost the same as - closely related
to - the Beckmesser motif in Meistersinger (I owe this insight
to Gerhard Koch; Act III of Siegfried was written just after
Meistersinger)! Furthermore, does this empty bombastic failure
of the final notes not also signal the catastrophy-to-come of Brunhilde
and Siegfried's love? As such, this "failure" of the duet is a structural
necessity.5 (One should nonetheless follow closely the
inner triadic structure of this duet: its entire dynamic is on the
side of Brunhilde who twice shifts her subjective stance, while
Siegfried remains the same. First, from her elevated divine position,
Brunhilde joyously asserts her love for Siegfried; then, once she
becomes aware of what Siegfried's passionate advances mean - the
loss of her safe distanced position - she displays fear of losing
her identity, of descending to the level of a vulnerable mortal
woman, man's prey and passive victim. In a wonderful metaphor, she
compares herself to a beautiful image in the water which gets blurred
once man's hand directly touches and disturbs the water. Finally,
she surrenders to Siegfried's passionate advances and throws herself
into the vortex.) However, excepting the last notes, Act III of
Siegfried - at least from the moment when Siegfried breaks
Wotan's spear to Brunhilde's awakening - is not only unbearably
beautiful, but also the most concise statement of the Oedipal problematic
in its specific Wagnerian twist.
32. On his way
to the magic mountain where Brunhilde lies, surrounded by a wall
of fire which can be tresspassed only by a hero who does not know
fear, Siegfried first encounters Wotan, the deposed (or, rather,
abdicated) supreme god, disguised as a Wanderer; Wotan tries to
stop him, but in an ambiguous way - basically, he WANTS Siegfried
to break his spear. After Siegfried disrespectfully does this, full
of contempt in his ignorance for the embittered and wise old man,
he progresses through the flames and perceives a wonderful creature
lying there in deep sleep. Thinking that the armored plate on the
creature's chest is making its breathing difficult, he proceeds
to cut off its straps by his sword; after he raises the plate and
sees Brunhilde's breasts, he utters a desperate cry of surprise:
"Das ist kein Mann! / This is no man!" This reaction, of
course, cannot but strike us as comic, exaggerated beyond credulity.
However, one should bear in mind a couple of things. First, the
whole point of the story of Siegfried till this moment is
that while Siegfried spent his entire youth in the forest in the
sole company of the evil dwarf Mime who claimed to be his only parent,
mother-father, he nonetheless observed that, in the case of animals,
parents are always a couple, and thus longs to see his mother, the
feminine counterpart of Mime. Siegfried's quest for a woman is thus
a quest for sexual difference, and the fact that this quest is at
the same time the quest of fear, of an experience that would teach
him what fear is, clearly points in the direction of castration
- with a specific twist. In the paradigmatic Freudian description
of the scene of castration (in his late short text on "Fetishism"),
the gaze discovers an absence where a presence (a penis) is expected,
while here, Siegfried's gaze discovers an excessive presence (of
breasts - and should one add that the typical Wagnerian soprano
is an opulent soprano with large breasts, so that Siegfried's "Das
ist kein Mann!" usually gives rise to a hearty laughter in the
public?).6
33. Secondly,
one should bear in mind here an apparent inconsistency in the libretto
which points the way to proper understanding of this scene: why
is Siegfried so surprised at not encountering a man, when, prior
to it, he emphasizes that he wants to penetrate the fire precisely
in order to find there a woman? To the Wanderer, he says: "Give
ground then, for that way, I know, leads to the sleeping woman."
And, a couple of minutes later: "Go back yourself, braggart! I must
go there, to the burning heart of the blaze, to Brunhilde!" From
this, one should draw the only possible conclusion: while Siegfried
was effectively looking for a woman, he did not expect her not to
be a man. In short, he was looking for a woman who would be
- not the same as man, but - a symmetric supplement to man, with
whom she would form a balanced signifying dyad - and what he found
was an unbearable lack/excess. What he discovered is the excess/lack
not covered by the binary signifier, i.e., the fact that Woman and
Man are not complementary but asymmetrical, that there is no yin-yang
balance - in short, that there is no sexual relationship.
34. No wonder,
then, that Siegfried's discovery that Brunhilde "is no man" gives
rise to an outburst of true panic accompanied by a loss of reality,
in which Siegfried takes refuge with his (unknown) mother: "That's
no man! A searing spell pierces my heart; a fiery anxiety fills
my eyes; my senses swim and swoon! Whom can I call on to help me?
Mother, mother! Think of me!" He then gather all his courage and
decides to kiss the sleeping woman on her lips, even if this will
mean his own death: "Then I will suck life from those sweetest lips,
though I die in doing so." What follows is the majestic awakening
of Brunhilde and then the love duet which concludes the opera. It
is crucial to note that this acceptance of death as the price for
contacting the feminine Other is accompanied musically by the echo
of the so-called motif of "renunciation," arguably the most important
leitmotif in the entire tetralogy. This motif is first heard in
the Scene 1 of Rhinegold, when, answering Alberich's query,
Woglinde discloses that "nur wer der Minne Macht versagt
/only the one who renounces the power of love" can take possession
of the gold; its next most noticeable appearance occurs towards
the end of Act 1 of Walkure, at the moment of the most triumphant
assertion of love between Sieglinde and Siegmund - just prior to
his pulling out of the sword from the tree trunk, Siegmund sings
it to the words: "Heiligster Minne hoechste Not / holiest
love's highest need." How are we to read these two occurrences together?
What if one treats them as two fragments of the complete sentence
that was distorted by "dreamwork," that is, rendered unreadable
by being split into two - the solution is thus to reconstitute the
complete proposition: "Love's highest need is to renounce its own
power." This is what Lacan calls "symbolic castration": if one is
to remain faithful to one's love, one should not elevate it into
the direct focus of one's love, one should renounce its centrality.
35. Perhaps a
detour through the best (or worst) of Hollywood melodrama can help
us to clarify this point. The basic lesson of King Vidor's Rhapsody
is that, in order to gain the beloved woman's love, the man has
to prove that he is able to survive without her, that he prefers
his mission or profession to her. There are two immediate choices:
(1) my professional career is what matters most to me, the woman
is just an amusement, a distracting affair; or (2) the woman is
everything to me, I am ready to humiliate myself, to forsake all
my public and professional dignity for her. They are both false:
they both lead to the man being rejected by the woman. The message
of true love is thus: even if you are everything to me, I can survive
without you, I am ready to forsake you for my mission or profession.
The proper way for the woman to test the man's love is thus to "betray"
him at the crucial moment of his career (the first public concert
in the film, the key exam, the business negotiation which will decide
his career) - only if he can survive the ordeal and accomplish successfully
his task although deeply traumatized by her desertion, will he deserve
her and she will return to him. The underlying paradox is that love,
precisely as the Absolute, should not be posited as a direct goal
- it should retain the status of a by-product, of something we get
as an undeserved grace. Perhaps, there is no greater love than that
of a revolutionary couple, where each of the two lovers is ready
to abandon the other at any moment if revolution demands it.
36. What, then,
happens when Siegfried kisses the sleeping Brunhilde, so that this
act deserves to be accompanied by the Renunciation motif? What Siegfried
says is that he will kiss Brunhilde "though I die in doing so"
- reaching out to the Other Sex involves accepting one's mortality.
Recall here another sublime moment from The Ring: in the
Act II of Die Walkuere, Siegmund literally renounces immortality.
He prefers to stay a common mortal if his beloved Sieglinde cannot
follow him to Walhalla, the eternal dwelling of the dead heroes
- is this not the highest ethical act of them all? The shattered
Brunhilde comments on this refusal: "So little do you value everlasting
bliss? Is she everything to you, this poor woman who, tired and
sorrowful, lies limp in your lap? Do you think nothing less glorious?"
Ernst Bloch was right to remark that what is lacking in German history
are more gestures like Siegmund's.
37. But which
LOVE is here renounced? To put it bluntly: the incestuous maternal
love. The "fearless hero" is fearless insofar as he experiences
himself as protected by his mother, by the maternal envelope - what
"learning to fear" effectively amounts to is learning that one is
exposed to the world without any maternal shield. It is essential
to read this scene in conjunction with the scene, from Parsifal,
of Kundry giving a kiss to Parsifal: in both cases, an innocent
hero discovers fear and/or suffering through a kiss located somewhere
between the maternal and the properly feminine. Till the late 19th
century, they practiced in Montenegro a weird wedding night ritual:
in the evening after the marriage ceremony, the son gets into bed
with his mother and, after he falls asleep, the mother silently
withdraws and lets the bride take her place: after spending the
rest of the night with the bride, the son has to escape from the
village into a mountain and spend a couple of days alone there in
order to get accustomed to the shame of being married. Does something
homologous not happen to Siegfried?
38. However,
the difference between Siegfried and Parsifal is that,
in the first case, the woman is accepted; in the second case, she
is rejected. This does not mean that the feminine dimension disappears
in Parsifal, and that we remain within the homoerotic male
community of the Grail. Syberberg was right when, after Parsifal's
rejection of Kundry which follows her kiss, "the last kiss of the
mother and the first kiss of a woman," he replaced Parsifal-the-boy
with another actor, a young cold woman - did he thereby not enact
the Freudian insight according to which identification is, at its
most radical, identification with the lost (or rejected) libidinal
object? We BECOME (identify with) the OBJECT which we were deprived
of, so that our subjective identity is a repository of the traces
of our lost objects.
Notes
1. Gary Tomlison, Metaphysical Song, (Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1999), 94.
2. Bertolt Brecht, Die Gedichte in einem Band, (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1999), 1005.
3. When, in his Der Fall Wagner, Nietzsche mockingly rejects
Wagner's universe, does his style not refer to these lines? Wagner
himself was such a repulsive figure to him - and there is a kind
of poetic justice in it, since Mime effectively is Wagner's ironic
self-portrait.
4. Joseph Kerman, Opera as Drama, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988).
5. This love-duet is also one of the Verdi-relapses in Wagner (the
best known being the revenge-trio that concludes the Act III of
The Twilight, apropos which already Bernard Shaw remarked
that it sounds like the trio of the conspirators from Un ballo
in maschera). Gutman designated it as a farewell to music drama
towards the rediscovered goal of the ultimate grand opera. See Robert
Gutman, Richard Wagner, (New York, 1968), 299.
6. As if referring to this scene, Jacques-Alain Miller once engaged
in a mental experiment, enumerating other possible operators of
sexual difference which could replace the absence/presence of penis,
and mentions the absence/presence of breasts.
|
|